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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAROLD L. WARD, C. ARNOLD FERRIN 
and LUCILLE N. FERRIN, his wife, LESLIE 
OLSEN and JESSIE OLSEN, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
WHAT ISSUES ARE INVOLVED IN THIS 
APPEAL~ 
Before entering into a general discussion of the 
matters set forth in appellant's brief, we deem it neces-
sary to point out to this court the following facts : 
This appeal presents some interesting and novel 
problems. Weber Basin Water Cons·ervancy District 
(hereinafter referred to as District) filed an action in 
the District Court of Weber County, No. 32126, to 
condemn 66.8 acres of land, title to which was vested 
in defendants Ferrin and being purchased under con-
tract by defendants Olsen. The tract so condemned 
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extended about one half the width of said farm. The 
State of Utah by and through its road commission 
(hereinafter called the State) also filed an action, No. 
32213, wherein it sought to condemn 5.66 acres out of 
the remainder of said farm for roadways. These road-
ways begin near the Northwest corner of the 66.9 acre 
tract and extend some distance through the remainder 
of the Olsen farm where the road divides, one leading 
to the left across the remainder of the Olsen farm 
from which a highway to a small farming community 
know as Liberty and the other extending in a North-
easterly direction to the town of Eden. (See defend-
ant's Exhibit 1.) It is apparent, therefore, that neither 
action results in a complete severance of the Olsen 
farm but the combined actions result in a complete 
severance of the fanns and cuts the portion of the 
farm not taken into three small irregular tracts. This 
presented a novel situation with respect to severance 
damages. 
If the cases were tried separately each plaintiff 
could deny that its action resulted in a complete sever-
ance, thereby n1aking it dif~icult for a jury to determine 
how 1nuch severance da1nage was caused by each separ-
ate condemnor. By reason of this novel situation, the 
parties entered into a written stipulation (See Page 37 
Record in File No. 33:213) the essence of which provided: 
1. That the two cases be consolidated for trial 
and tried together. 
2. That the follo,Ying issues would be :5Ub-
Iuitted to the jury: 
A. That a jury would return a judgment 
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in favor of defendants jointly and against 
plaintiff District for the fair market 
value of the 66.88 acres so condemned by 
it. 
B. That the jury would return a judgn1ent 
in favor of defendants jointly against 
the State for the fair market value of 
the 5.66 acres so condemned; and 
C. That the issue as to the amount of sever-
ance damages, if any, which defendants 
would be 'entitled to receive, be submitted 
to the jury and judgment entered against 
both plaintiffs for the total amount of 
severance damages, if any, jointly caused 
by the taking of the lands by the plain-
tiffs jointly. 
D. That the court n1ay then apportion the 
severance damages, if any, between the 
two plaintiffs and enter judg1nent ac-
cordingly. 
A jury was i1npanelled and the cause submitted to 
the jury under a special verdict in accordance with the 
stipulation. The jury returned the following special 
verdict: 
1. $33,400.00 against the District for the value of 
the 66.8 acres. 
2. $2,830.00 against the State for the value of the 
5.66 acres. 
3. $23,109.00 severance darnages against both plain-
tiffs. 
The State of Utah apparently was satisfied with the 
verdict. It filed no motion for a new trial, nor did it 
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appeal to this court. Therefore, the judgment as against 
State became final March 7, 1958. Plaintiff District 
filed a rnotion for a new trial. This 1notion was over-
ruled on March 31, 1958 and on April 29, 1958 (long 
after the judgment against State had become final) 
District filed a notice of appeal to this court. The 
notice of appeal says that plaintiff District appeals 
to the Supren1e Court from that certain judgment in 
favor of defendants and against the plaintiff District. 
NOTE: The appeal is from the judgrnent against the 
plaintiff District and n1akes no reference to the joint 
judgment against both plaintiffs. It is of course axio-
rnatic that one may appeal frmn only a part of a judg-
ment. What then is the situation? Defendants have 
a final judgrnent against the State of utah for $2,830.00 
(value of the land taken by it) and $23,109.00 amount 
of the joint severance damages. 
Assuming for the sake of r..rgurnent that it is re-
versible ·error, an assumption, however, not shared by 
respondent, what would be the result f \\T ould the 
judgment fixing severance darnages stand as against 
the State of Utah~ It ~eerus to us that this result is 
inevitable because the judgrnent against State was final 
and unappealable so far as State is concerned before 
an appeal was taken by the District. 
Furthel'lnore, we contend, for the reasons hereto-
fore set out, that plaintiffs haYe appealed only from that 
part of the judg1uent fixing the YalUL' of the 66.8 acres 
and that the notice of appeal did not refer in any rnanner 
to the joint judgn1ent for scYPrance dan1ages. If we 
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are correct in our contention, then it must follow either: 
1. The judgment for severance damages is 
final as against the State of Utah. 
2. That by reason of the notice of appeal by 
District only to the judgment \against 
District and that the only issue pre-
sented by this appeal is whether or not 
this appeal is limited in scope only to 
that part of the judgment fixing the value 
of the 66.8 acres. 
The plaintiffs, by virtue of the stipulation, agreed 
that the jury n1ight fix the amount of the severance 
damages and leave it to the court to apportion the same 
between the plaintiffs. Again assuming for the sake 
of this argurnent only, that this court should reverse 
the judgrnent for severance dmnages, then what would 
be the effect~ Would it order a new trial in favor of 
District only and submit to the jury the amount of 
severance damages to be assessed against the District 
only, which would be in direct violation of the stipulation 
which was in the nature of a binding agreement that 
the jury 1night determine the amount of severance dam-
ages as against both plaintiffs. By doing so, the court 
would in effect set aside a valid and binding stipulation. 
Respondent will now discu~s the various points 
raised by appellant District in the order presented by 
appellant: 
POIN'l, 1. Appellant contends there is insufficient 
evidence to support the answer to Question Nuntber 
One. This respondent~ emphatically dispute. Defend-
ants produce two experts - Wilkinson and Welker in 
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addition to the testi1nony of defendant Olsen. They 
testified that in their opinion this 66.8 acre tract was 
worth $600.00 per acre. Their evidence as well as the evi-
dence of the plaintiff, as shown on the map, disclosed that 
the taking of this 66.8 acres of land took from this 
dairy farm the very heart of the farm. It comprised 
the choice meadow land most of which was sub-irri-
gated. The jury fixed its vaiue at $500.00 per acre. 
Hence, the verdict is $100.00 per acre less than the 
value fixed hy defendant's witnesses. Appellant asserts 
that Wilkinson's opinion was based largely upon un-
accepted offers of sale. This assertion we emphatically 
dispute. An examination of Wilkinsons testimony re-
veals that he had appraised properties for more than 
sixteen years in Weber County. He then detailed what 
investigations he had 1nade and he arrived at on opinion 
that the tract of land in question was worth $600.00 
per acre. It see1ns difficult to understand appellant's 
criticis1n, especially in view of the fact that his own 
experts, as "·ell as the expert Capener (sic) arrived at 
their conclusions in exactly the san1e way as did \Yilkin-
son. It is admitted by all sides that there had been very 
few sales in the Yicinity of the land in question. 
We think the conunents and observations 1nade by 
Mr. Chief Justice nicDonough in the recent case of, 
Weber Basin \Yater ConseiTancy District 
vs. Skeen 
328 P. ~nd 730 
Reported in advance sheet of Septe1nber 1:2. 1958, 
1s a cmnplete answer to appellant's contention. On 
Page Sixteen of his brief counsel, in referring to ''rilkin-
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son's testimony, says : 
"He, Wilkinson, testified further that * * * there 
had been an increase in value because of the 
enlargement of Pine View Reservoir." 
He fails, however, to point out where Wilkinson so 
testified. The only place where we can find a dis-
cussion of this matter in Wilkinson's cross examination 
starts on the bottom of Page Ninety-three of the record. 
Wilkinson was asked whether or not in his opinion 
farm lands have increased in value substantially from 
1950 to 1956. His answer was "Yes". 
Then he was asked, "What percentage have they 
increased~" and he answered: 
"Well, I don't know." 
Q. "You think they have increased and that 
is all you know about it~" 
A. "That is right." 
Q. "Do you think that the value of lands in 
Ogden Valley have increas·ed because of the en-
largement of Pine View Reservoir~" 
A. "I think they have." 
Q. "And when did that increase occur~" 
A. "Well, I think it has been going on ever 
since they put the Pine View Dam in there from 
the beginning." 
Q. You think the Ogden Valley lands have 
increased between 1950 and 1956 ~" 
A. "Yes, Sir." 
Q. "And you don't know how much f' 
A. "No, I don't." 
Nowhere does Wilkinson say that he thinks the lands 
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have increased twenty-five per cent due to the enlarge-
ment of the Pine View Dam. 
Wilkinson also testified that due to the inflation 
real estate values have increased. We think this court 
can take judicial notice of that fact. It is true that 
witness W elkes was asked on cross examination if by 
reason of the growing scarcity of meadow land in the 
area due to the enlargement of Pine View Reservoir 
that fact had affected the value of land in the area, and 
he testified : 
"I think tthat would have affected the value." 
and when further pressed he answered: 
"Perhaps about one-fourth." 
We say, therefore, that the witness Wilkinson did not 
say that the value of this land had increased twenty-five 
per cent due to the enlargement of the reservoir and, 
therefore, there is a1nple evidence to sustain the verdict 
of the jury on the testimony of Wilkinson alone. 
We shall reserve for further discussion the question 
as to whether or not increased value of land generally 
due to a condemnation proceeding is not recoverable 
in fixing the value of the owner's land. 
WHAT IS THE :MEASURE OF COI\IPENSATION 
TO BE ALLOWED THE 0\VNER OF L~\ND 
BEING CONDEl\INED1 
Appellant asserb that defendant's evidence dis-
closed that the Yalne as te~tified to by defendant's wit-
nesses, included enhanced value due to the raising of 
Pine View Dam. A~ heretofore noted, however, neither 
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the defendant Olsen nor his expert Wilkinson so testi-
fied. rrhey fixed the value of the tract taken at $600.00 
per acre without reference to any increased value 
brought about by the enlarge1nent of the dam. Hence, 
there is e01npetent evidence in this record that the 
value was fixed as of the date of the taking without 
reference to any alleged enhanced value brought about 
by the raising of the dam. With respect to defendant's 
witness vVelker, the only reference to this subject is as 
set forth on Page Eighteen of appellant's brief. On 
cross exmnination counsel asked this question: 
Q. ":Mr. Welker, in fixing this figure at 
$600.00 per acre, did you take into consideration 
the growing scarcity of meadow land up in that 
area due to the enlargement of Pine View Reser-
voir1" 
A. "I think that would have affected the 
value." 
It is apparent that counsel directed his question to the 
scarcity of meadow land which is so necessary for dairy 
purposes and not to increased value brought about by 
the enlargmnent of the dam itself. If meadow land is 
unavailable, it n1ight affect the value of the remain~_ 
ing land. Is there any valid reason why the owner of 
such land should not be cornpensated for its actual 
value due to the inability of prospective purchasers to/ 
obtain meadow land in the area in question~ In this 
connection, it should be remembered that much of de-
fendant's land being taken by the District will not be 
covered by the waters of the enlarged reservoir but it 
encompasses an area sought to be retained by the Dis-
trict abutting the reservoir, presumably for recreational 
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purposes. The question of what elements may or may 
not be included rests in utter confusion. 
In revewing the authorities, it is apparent that 
the courts have been influenced quite largely by the 
wording of their constitutional and statutory provision. 
Article One, Section 22 
Utah Constitution. 
provides that private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use. 
Section 78-34-10 
U. C. A. 
provides how compensation and damages shall be 
assessed, and 
Section 78-34-11 
U. C. A. 
provides when the right shall be deemed to have ac-
crued. Unlike sonie constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, nothing is said about increased or diminishing 
values by reason of the construction of the improve-
ment. This court is conunitted to the proposition that 
under our constitutional and statutory provisions the 
value of the land 1nust be assessed as of the date of the 
issuance of sumnwns and nothing is said as to how that 
value must be ascertained. 
All of the testinwny introduced by both plaintiff 
and defendants ·was directed to the sole question as to 
what was the value of this land on the day of the 
taking, without reference to whether there was any in-
creased value due to the enlargmnent of the Pine View 
10 
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Dam. The only difference between the evidence offered 
by the plaintiff and defendants was a difference in 
opinion as to its then market value. 
There is a long annotation in 147 A. L. R. 65. A 
reading of this annotation discloses the utter confusion 
which exists. The original Pine View Dam was con-
structed in 1934. There is no evidence in this record 
when it was officially determined that the reservoir 
should be enlarged nor when it was determined that 
defendant's land should be taken, nor when surveys 
were made or filed, nor when the project was approved. 
We contend that plaintiff utterly failed to prove the 
essential pre-requisites to dernonstrate whether or not 
the increase if not allowable was to take effect. If 
counsel clai1ned that there was such an increase in values, 
it seems to us in the light of the many decisions that it 
was incumbent upon him to introduce evidence estab-
lishing these many facts and to offer ·evidence con-
sistent with this theory, none of which he atte1npted to_ 
do. We call particular attention to Note Four on Page 
85 and K ote Five on Page 88 of the annotations supra. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN RE·FUSING TO AD11IT 
DEFENDANT OLSEN'S INCOlVIE TAX RETURNS 
FOR THE YEARS 1951 to 1956 ~ 
Appellant says at Page 21 of his brief that it was 
the theory of the defendants that the highest and best 
use of their farm was for a dairy; that because of its · 
location and the kind of land of which it was comprised, 
it was peculiarly adapted for that use. We agree with 
this statement and we might call attention to the fact 
that that was also the view and theory of plaintiff's 
11 
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·expert Kiepe. He testified on cross examination that 
before the taking he considered it a good dairy farm; 
that to operate a dairy farm you have to treat it as a 
unit; that the ideal dairy farm is one that produces 
feed sufficient to feed the dairy herd and also produces 
meadow lands for grazing and the production of hay 
and grain and that this farm had all of those virtues. 
('l"r. 221) In fact, we invite the court's attention 
. to his entire testimony on cross examination from 
Pages 221 to 249. At Page 229 he \\Tas asked this 
question: 
Q. "Now, of course, if the farm after the 
taking is incapable of producing enough feed 
for the dairy herd, does that fact interfere vrith 
the efficient operation of the dairy~" 
A. "Yes." 
He states further at Page 239: 
"I am prepared to say that I don't think it is a 
full time operation any more and that any one 
who would use it for a dairy fann would have 
to greatly reduce his herd.'' 
Summarizing the evidence produced by both sides, it 
sustained the following: The entire fann was con-
tiguous; that it was capable of sustaining at least fifty 
head of registered Guernsey and ten to fifteen head of 
dry stock; that he had buildings, barns, 1nilk sheds 
and other ilnproven1ents capable of operating a dairy 
far1n of the size and quality referred to and that it was 
an ideal dairy fann; that after the taking and the cut-
ting up of the fann it could not support nwre than 
fifteen to twenty dairy row~ at the nwst: that under 
12 
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modern conditions the dairy business requires the oper-
ation of a herd of at least fifty head. It was also 
testified by defendants, and not denied by plaintiff, that 
lands of comparable kind could not be purchased in 
the vicinity of this farm. 
Plaintiffs offered in evidence defendant's copy of 
his income tax returns for the years 1951 to 1956 to 
show what his losses and profits derived from his dairy 
operations were as reflected therein. The court sus-
tained defendant's objection to the introduction of these 
tax returns. We contend that he court committed no 
error in so doing. 
What plaintiff claimed he was trying to prove by 
the tax returns was whether or not there was a profit 
made in the operation of defendant's business. The 
tax returns for the years 1951 to 1954 related to com-
bined operations of several separate business and farm 
operations conducted by defendant. It is recognized, 
of course, that profits for income tax purposes is 
vastly different from profits as that term is usually 
undersood. Deductions are allowable for depreciation 
of improvements, fann buildings, etc. for bad debts, 
for interest paid. Defendant offered to furnish plain-
tiff a statement as to the amount of milk produced and 
sold, the amount of crops produced. (Tr. 46) but plain-
tiff did not want this information. He wanted to intro-
duce the tax returns and nothing 1nore. We contend the 
trial court was correct because: 
A. Evidence of profits derived front a business 
conducted on property is too speculative, un-
certain and remote to be considered as a 
13 
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basis for computing or ascertaining the 
market value of property in condemnation 
proceedings. 
See, 
7 ALR, 163 
B. The tax returns did not correctly reflect the 
amount of profits actually earned from the 
operation of this particular business. 
C. To have received the tax returns would have 
opened up a collateral proceeding which would 
have led to utter confusion. 
D. That if the court was in error, no prejudice 
resulted from this ruling. 
Defendant had no objection to plaintiff inquiring as to 
how much hay, grain and pasturage was produced from 
the farm, nor the amount of milk produced and sold. 
This evidence would have given the jury complete in-
formation as to the productivity of the farm and of 
the resulting income derived from the sale of the milk, 
the only product which was sold. See, 
Denver vs. Quick 
113 P. 2nd, 999 
134 A.L.R. 1120 
It is our view that the operation involved '"as the con-
ducting of a business on the land itself. All crops raised 
were fed to the dairy herd. None was sold. The milk 
produced was sold to the \Veber Central Dairy. To 
operate a dairy requires a8 1nuch skill, knowledge and 
efficiency as the conduet of a rnercantile or nianufactur-
ing business. The trial judge observed, correctly we 
think, that admitting these incon1e tax returns would 
convert this action into a tax accounting suit; that it 
would so confuse the issues that the jury would become 
14 
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confused and bewildered. Considerable !attitude on the 
question of admission or rejection of evidence is reposed 
in a trial judge and his rulings will not be overruled by 
the appellate court except for a clear abuse of discretion. 
Even though the court refused to permit the tax re-
turn~ to be introduced, he did allow a great amount of 
!attitude by way of cross exan1ination. Note, for in-
stance, the cross exa1nination of the witness Felt, com-
mencing on Page 144 where the following questions 
were asked: 
Q. "Do you know whether it has n1ade a 
profit in the last six years of operation~" 
A. ''All I can judge on is the production of 
his cattle. I know wl1at they produced in pounds 
of butter fat average. ~l_1hey belong to the Cow 
Testing Association and that is open to any-
body." 
Q. ··I understand." 
A. "He had a very good herd. They pro-
duced better than 350 pounds." 
Q. "I asked you if you knew whether he n1ade 
a profit on his operation." 
A. "I couldn't say as to that. He should 
have done with the a1nount of butter fat produced 
by his cows.' 
(This latter answer was stricken) 
Q. ''Do you know as a n1atter of fact whether 
or not .Jfr. Olsen has made a profit on that ground 
for the last five or six years in the operation of 
the dairy herd ? " 
A. "I don't know." 
Q. "If I were to tell you I had information 
to the effect that he suffered a loss over a nunl-
ber of years, would you think I was telling you 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the truth or would I be misleading you f' 
A. "Well, I wouldn't know.' 
and again at Page 259 in the cross examination of defend-
ant Olsen, the following questions were asked and the 
following answers made: 
Q. "Now, Mr. Olsen, did you realize a net 
profit from the operation of your dairy farm in 
1955f' 
A. "I don't know." 
Q. "I hand you your 1955 income tax return 
and I'll ask you to examine that and then answer 
the question." 
The court sustained the defendant's objection to the 
admission of the income tax returns, then followed: 
Q. "Do you know 'vhether you operated the 
dairy at a profit from 1951 to 1956, inclusive?" 
A. ''No, sir." 
Q. "You don't know t" 
A. "No, sir." 
Even if the court was in error in his ruling, which 
we deny, yet we cannot see how the plaintiff was pre-
judiced. B~T inference, this jury was told that the de-
fendant 1nade no profit. The question for the jury's 
detennination was not whether he 1nade a profit in the 
conduct of his business as reflected by his income tax 
returns but the real question at issue was what was 
the fair cash Inarket Yalue of the. property as of the 
date of taking. 
This court judicially know8, and the eYidence also 
shows that Utah has experienced an unprecedented boom 
due to the inflation, as well as the transition from an 
agricultural to industrial status. Land Yalues haYP risen 
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rapidly. Land values of today are not reflected in farm i 
income but are based more on a speculative market.' :--· 
If farm lands are valued on the basis of crop production, 
the prices being paid today could never be justified. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
EVIDENCE AS TO PRIOR AMOUNT OLSENS 
CONTRACTED TO PAY NEARLY SEVEN YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE TAKING~ 
We think the court was justified in its ruling and 
that no prejudice resulted from his ruling. As hereto-
fore pointed out, the undisputed evidence discloses, 
and this court judicially knows, that due to the impact 
of inflation a dollar today is not worth more than 
fifty cents or perhaps less, and, in addition to this, 
Utah has experienced an unprecedented boom due to 
its transition from an agricultural to industrial state: 
Consequently, land values have risen rapidly and land 1~ 
values of today are not reflected in farm income but 
rather on a speculative 1narket. Had we been passing / 
through a stable economy there might be some basis 
for permitting evidence of the purchase price nearly 
seven years prior to be admitted, providing a proper 
foundation is laid for the admission of this evidence, 
although we doubt that even then, the trial court's re-
fusal to admit such testimony would be an abuse of his 
discretion. However that may be, when we consider 
all of the facts, it is difficult for us to see how the 
purchase price paid or agreed to be paid nearly seven 
years prior can be of any aid to a jury in arriving at 
present market values. Even under normal conditions, 
evidence of this character might result in prejudice to 
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the defendant. If a purchaser seven years ago had the 
sagacity to purchase property at a bargain, even though 
made on an open market, still there is no reason why 
the condeamnor should profit because of his bargain 
and the admission of this testin1ony could result in the 
jury being influenced largely by the amount paid rather 
than the market value as of the date of taking. 
Counsel cites a recent work by, 
Kaltenbach 
See Page 24 
It is to be noted that the author says that the intro-
duction of this evidence is subject to hYo conditions; 
namely, that the sale n1ust have been made ·within a 
reasonable time so that it has some bearing on the 
market value and also that the sale must lzwce been 
voluntary. Appellant 1nade an offer of proof, see Tr. 
261. He also asked defendant Olsen the direct question 
as to what the contract price was. \\ e submit that it 
was incun1bent upon appellant, e\~en though this evi-
dence was admissible, to first lay a proper foundation 
to prove or offer to proYe that the sale fron1 Ferrins 
was a voluntary transaction between parties, each of 
whon1 was capable and desirous of protecting his own 
interest. No such foundation for the ad1nission of this 
testi1nony wa~ either laid or offered to be laid by 
appellant. 
It is also to be noted that in the citation fr01n, 
Nichols (quoted hy appellant) 
At Page 23, 
the author says: 
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''And no change in condition or market fluctu-
ation in value has occurred since the sale.' 
This seems to us to be a complete answer because all 
of the evidence offered by both sides reflected that 
there had been a fluctuation in values which had occur-
red since the date of the sale. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER SIX~ 
vVe contend that under the rulings of this court, 
that Instruction Number Six is a correct statement 
of the law with respect to when and under what cir-
cumstances severance dan1ages may be allowed where, 
as in this case, the evidence by all experts was that 
defendants' farm comprised one unit and that as a 
unit it was adaptable for and used as a dairy unit 
operation and that there were no comparable lands 
available which could be purchased to replace the lands 
actually taken. See, 
Provo vVater Users Association 
vs. Carlson 
103 Utah, 93 
133 P. 2nd, 777 
State vs. L. D. S. Church 
247 P. 2nd, 269, and 
264 P. 2nd, 281. 
The court did not commit reversible error for failure 
to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction Number Five. 
\V e think the court fully instructed the jury on all 
issues presented and that the jury fully understood the 
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meaning of severance damages. See Instruction Num-
bers 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respondent's contention that no reversible error 
was committed by the trial court; that the case was 
fairly presented by both sides and that the instructions 
view as a whole correctly and adequately instructed the 
jury as to the law of the case; that the special verdict 
of the jury is a1nply sustained by the evidence and that 
the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
LE ROY B. YO-cXG of 
YOUXG, THATCHER & GL~\S:JLcL.\'N, 
AttoTneys for Respondent 
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